THE SIGNIFICANCE OF REGINA VERSUS SIDDIQUE

2010-08-01

     A ruling by the Court in Regina vs. Siddique on May 18, 2010 appears to reinforce the new nomenclature of interpreters (as fully accredited and conditionally accredited). Strictly speaking, there are no more accredited interpreters per se in Ontario! Here are excerpts from the the ruling which speaks for itself:

     "Joginder Khalsa is the interpreter assigned to this case. He has been a court accredited interpreter under the old testing regime for eight years. He has taken his tests under the new regime of accreditation. Those tests were taken on the 30th of April this year and Mr. Khalsa is awaiting the results of the test.

     "Mr. Caroline, who acts for the accused, Siddique, objects to Mr. Khalsa continuing as the interpreter. He says unless the interpreter is fully accredited, he is not suitable for use in the proceedings. Mr. Caroline raises no particular concerns about the integrity or competence of Mr. Khalsa...

     "There is a superficial attractiveness to saying, well, Mr. Khalsa is accredited under the old system and presumably will become accredited under the new system. The practical difficulty with that analysis is that it is relatively common knowledge that the attrition rate following the new tests was nothing less than dramatic. Published reports have indicated that only approximately one-third of previously accredited interpreters achieved fully accredited status. Approximately another 50 percent were conditionally accredited and the balance were not accredited at all. Anecdotally, there have been individuals who have provided court interpretation over cases in which I have presided and have seen in the Courts of Ontario for at least the last 10 to 20 years, who failed the test outright…

     "I have every confidence that he will become an accredited interpreter…

     "The consequences of proceeding on, in the absence of an accredited interpreter and looking at a worse case scenario, that Mr. Khalsa would only become conditionally accredited or not accredited at all, would in essence involve doing the trial over again. It is a trial with delicate issues. I am advised that the complainant was three-and-a-half-years-old at the time of the alleged complaint. She is approximately five years old now. It would be exceedingly unfortunate if the trial had to be re-done because of a failure of interpretation services…"

     The Court seems to agree with the objection raised by the defence that an interpreter's existing accreditation is no longer valid, at least, for current trial purposes. The Court's confidence "… that he will become an accredited interpreter…", and the phrase "…in the absence of an accredited interpreter…" expressed in the presence of a previously accredited interpreter turns out to be a nail in his coffin pending a possible resurrection in future. In the Court's dictionary, at least in this case, accredited interpreters and fully accredited interpreters (according to the new nomenclature) are interchangeable. No doubt the Ministry of the Attorney General and the defence, at least in this case, are of the same view.  

     The Court cites the decision of the Supreme Court in R. v. Tran (1992) C.C.C. (3d), 218, and accepts that "The guiding principles are that the interpretation should be competent, continuous, precise, impartial and contemporaneous." It is evident that Mr. Khalsa, who has been an interpreter for 8 years, is experienced enough to interpret competently, continuously, precisely, impartially and contemporaneously. Still, the Court hands down a ruling in agreement with the objection raised by the defence to the effect that the interpreter's existing accreditation is no longer valid, at least, for current trial purposes. It is quite legal, logical, and natural for the Court to wait for the results of his test despite the technicality the defence takes advantage of in having the case adjourned under existing circumstances. At the same time the ruling, handed down in deference to the new nomenclature, inevitably contributes to the multiplication of technicalities available to the defence.

     A question does arise in one's mind as an afterthought: Was Mr. Khalsa interpreting the ruling (which runs into 10 pages) to the defendant competently, continuously, precisely, impartially and contemporaneously? An answer in the affirmative would contradict the ruling (because it was presumably interpreted by Mr. Khalsa competently, continuously, precisely, impartially and contemporaneously). An answer in the negative would invalidate the ruling at least for the time being (because it was presumably not interpreted by Mr. Khalsa competently, continuously, precisely, impartially and contemporaneously). The Court went ahead with its ruling and Mr. Khalsa's interpretation despite the obvious contradiction in doing so.

     According to the ruling, "Unless the court is fluent in the language of interpretation, there is no way of assessing how well the interpreter is performing her task" (sic). In other words, a monolingual court has no option other than relying on the accreditation of interpreters by the Ministry.

     We are not concerned here about the legality or validity of the test administered by the Ministry, which we have already dealt with elsewhere. Our focus here is just the modality of the test which appears to be none other than a speed test. We wonder how such a speed test could vouch for any "degree of efficiency" or "expertise" of competence, continuity, precision, impartiality and contemporaneousness an interpreter is supposed to possess or has achieved through his or her experience. We wonder how one could ascertain the calibre of an interpreter with a speedometer.   

     Only a panel of senior interpreters can gauge the competence of an individual interpreter existing or aspiring. It is, therefore, advisable for the Ministry to appoint such a panel of senior interpreters, at least, for each main language, in consultation with the Judiciary, Prosecution and Defence. The panels may, in co-ordination with each other, help the Ministry (1) devise and conduct written and spoken tests for candidates, (2) train selected candidates in a real court setting and in professional conduct and (3) refer, by consensus, successful candidates to the Ministry for accreditation. It is usual for seniors to phase in juniors and for juniors to phase out seniors. This is common sense and widespread practice too.